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This paper rises the issue of how rhe concept of metaphor is understood in three views of linguisrics 
andior philosophical theorizing of meraphor. The theories to be considered are: the interaction rheory (as 
represenred by Black 1993). thepragmatic theory (as discursed by Searle 1993) and rhe cognitivist theory (as  
elaborared by Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and iukoff 1993). The paper goes even funher by taking into 
considerarion rhe metaphorical ways in which the dlrerent authors tak  about metaphor. The main jindings of 
the study are the following: (1) scientijic language is deeply metapholical; (2) despite the radically different 
views on metaphor apressed by the three schools, the metaphorical ways of dealing with meraphor is strikingly 
similar; and (3) the methodr used in cognitive linguistics prove successful even on this metalinguistic level. 
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RESUMEN 
Este anículo planrea el rema de cómo el concepro de metáfora se percibe desde tres perspectivas de 
la lingüística y/o de la teoná filosófica de la metáfora. Las teon'as a tratar son: la teoná de la interacción 
(representada por Black 1993). la teoría pragmática @lanreada por Searle 1993) y la teoná cognitivista 
(elaborada por Lakoff y Johnson 1980 y iukoff 1993). El anículo va más alkí al tomar en consideración las 
f o m  metafóricas en las que los distintos autores hablan de la meráfora. Los principales hallazgos del estudio 
son los siguientes: (1) el lenguaje cientoco es profundamenre metafórico; (2) a pesar de los puntos de vista 
radicalmente opuestos con respecto a la metáfora apresados por estas tres escuelas, las f o m  metafóricas de 
tratar la metafora son notablemente similares; y (3) los métodos empleados en la lingüística cognitiva resultan 
ser eficaces incluso en este nivel metalingüístico. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: metáfora de metáfora, meta-metáfora, teona comparatista, teona de la interacción, teoría 
pragmática, teona cognitivista 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The presupposition in comection with scientific language has long been that it has to 
be literal, because this is the only way reality can be described in a properly - precise and 
unarnbiguous, in one word - objective way. No tropes or other examples of figurative 
language are acceptable in a desirably testable characterization of the surrounding world. 
This paper is meant to prove that scientific language is much less literal than it is thought to 
be. 
The most inuiguing way to indicate this turned out to be the promising possibility of 
looking at the different theories of metaphor just to find that even when discussing metaphor 
the scientists cannot get rid of metaphorical expressions. To notice this we need a certain 
meta-linguistic attitude, which focuses not only on what is said but also on how it is 
conveyed. 
As a foundation to my analysis, in the fust part of my paper 1 will provide a short 
summary of three different theories of metaphor: the interaction theory (based on Black 
1993), the pragmatic theory (based on Searle 1993 and Sadock 1993) and the cognitivist 
theory (based on Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1993). In the second part 1 will 
present a detailed analysis of the metaphors used for metaphors - which 1 will cal1 meta- 
metaphors - by the above mentioned linguists. The methods used in the analysis are 
cognitivist ones, an approach which 1 myself consider the closest to the nature of metaphor 
and the best to serve my purposes. 
11. METAPHOR AS A CONCEPT IN A VARIETY OF THEORIES 
The interaction theory 
It is true of al1 the theories 1 am going to discuss that they do not accept the 
traditional Aristotelian view of metaphor as grasping a similarity between two objects. In this 
so-called comparison theory metaphor is nothing more than a conuacted simile stating that 
an object resembles another in certain clear aspects. In this view the speaker could have as 
well formulated his description of the object in question in literal statements, which express 
exactly the same idea in a much more precise way. In other words, any metaphor can be 
paraphrased, that is, the figurative expression can any time be communicated in a down-to- 
earth literal way. The speaker's using tropological expressions is a mere whim, a deviation, 
an aberration, so metaphor is parasitic on 'normal usage'. Metaphors are vague, inessential 
frills, which can be appropnate for the purposes of politicians and poets, but not for 'serious 
people' like scientists. 
The interaction theory - summarised by Black in his 1993 work (see bibliography) - 
leaves behind many axioms of the comparison theory while keeping others. For example, it 
considers metaphor to mediate some kind of analogy or structural correspondence between 
two concepts, saying that this is the correct insight behind the classical comparison view of 
metaphor as an ellipticated simile. But it continues by saying that «Implication is not the same 
as covert identity: Looking at a scene ihrough blue spectacles is different from companng 
that scene with something else* (Black 1993:30). Moreover, metaphor in Black's view is not 
replaceable, by uttering it the speaker means just what he said and feels he had a 'flash of 
insight' rather than just a perception of a similitude. 
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The reason why the interaction theory is called so is that the focus is not placed on 
the resemblance between the two nodes of the metaphor but, on the contrary, upon the verbal 
opposition and interaction between the two semantic contents. The literal-figurative 
distinction, on the other hand, is still kept: in Black's view the tacit knowledge of the literal 
meaning induces a feeling of dissonance or tension between the literal and metaphorical 
interpretations of the metaphor. 
Another important issue the interaction theory raises is the question of the so-called 
'dead metaphors'. Black does not consider dead metaphors to be metaphors: .This [i.e. the 
trite opposition between 'dead' and 'live' metaphors] is no more helpful than, say, treating 
a corpse as a special case of a person: A so-called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all, 
but merely an expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical use. (Black 1993:25). 
The interaction theory also introduces the idea that metaphors are not necessarily only 
based on pre-existing connections between two concepts, but can also generate new 
knowledge and insight by changing relationships between the things designated. To illustrate 
how rnetaphors can actually create similarities Black uses a metaphor: he asks, 'Did the other 
side of the moon exist before it was seen?'. The answer is undoubtedly 'Yes'. To the 
question 'Did the view of Mount Everest from a point one hundred feet above its surnmit 
exist before anybody had seen that view?' the answer is again 'Yes', but only in a 
counterfactual way: If anybody had been in the position to view the mountain from the point 
specified, it would have looked the same as it does now frorn an aeroplane. If, then, we 
speak about views, it is logical that we also need viewers, and the view that is actually seen 
is a fact about the mountain as well as about the viewer. Therefore, metaphors are cognitive 
instruments indispensible for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are then tnily 
present (Black 1993: 36-37). 
In sum, the interaction theory views metaphor as the interaction between two semantic 
fields expressed by the two end-points of a metaphor; its special effect coming from the 
tension between the literal and the figurative meanings; rnetaphors have a strong raison d'etre 
since they are not replaceable and they can create new relationships between two concepts. 
The pragmatic theory 
Just like interactionalists, pragmatists - prirnarily Searle 1993 and Sadock 1993 - also 
stan off by opposing their views to the traditional cornparison theory. In their view, too, 
metaphors are essentially not paraphrasable, because in most of the cases there is no literal 
expression that conveys exactly what we rnean, because ewithout using the metaphorical 
expression, we will not reproduce the semantic content which occurred in the hearer's 
comprehension of the utterancem (Searle 1993: 11 1). If we try to paraphrase a metaphor, we 
either do not fmd a corresponding literal statement or, even if we do, it is somehow 
inadequate, sornething is lost in meaning. Similarity is viewed as a vacuous predicate, 
because any two things are similar in some respect or another, and how do we know exactly 
which respect the speaker has in mind when uttering a metaphor? (Searle's example is Sally 
is a block of ice. where there do not seem to be any literal similarities between objects which 
are cold and people who are unemotional.) But we still understand the speaker perfectly, and 
the way this is done is exactly what pragmatists are interested in. 
Searle compares metaphors to irony and indirect speech acts in the respect that in al1 
three cases there is a break between what the speaker says (i.e. sentence meaning) and what 
he means (i.e. utterance rneaning). The pattern to this is: 
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'S is P' means in fact 'S is R' ,  
where the first, that is, the sentence meaning, is never metaphorical, while the second, 
the utterance meaning, can be metaphorical. The way metaphors are understood is the 
following: when the utterance is defective if taken literally, the hearer looks for an 
utterance meaning that differs from the sentence meaning and that is no longer defective 
(Searle 1993:103). To do this, speaker and hearer must share (i) certain principles that 
associate the P term with a set of possible values of R, and (ii) some strategies that enable 
them, given their knowledge of the S term, to restrict the range of possible values of R to 
the actual value, where oniy those possible values of R which determine possible values 
of S can be actual values of R (Searle 1993: 107). 
While Searle - although conceiving of metaphor as a 'roundabout' (1993:89) way of 
expression - insists that metaphors are intrinsically irreplaceable, Sadock sees metaphor as 
an indirect way of assening something which might have been communicated directly in 
terms of the conventions of language (1993:43). In explaining this, Sadock states that 
metaphor appears to be in conflict with the Gricean cooperative principle, therefore the 
hearer is forced to seek a figurative, but cooperative, intent behind the utterance (ibid.). 
What made me list the two authors under the same heading is that both seem to push 
metaphor out of the realm of descriptive linguistics: Searle suggests that metaphor is not a 
question of language per se but one of language use; Sadock even risks the statement that al1 
noniiteral speech falls outside the domain of synchronic linguistics, because the basis of, say, 
metaphor is a kind of indirection that is shared with nonianguage behavior (Sadock 1993:42). 
In this view, the problem of metaphor is strictly a pragmatic question. 
Pragmatists, too, have something to say about dead metaphors: Sadock considers it 
a commonplace that they were ualive and kicking at some time in the pastn (1993:44) (note 
that in formulating this he places the phenomenon in the realm of diachronic linguistics); 
Searle goes even further by saying oxymoronically that udead metaphors have lived onn 
(1993:88). This means in his interpretation that they have become dead through continual 
use, but their continual use is a clue that they satisfy some semantic need. 
To sum up, in the pragmatic theory metaphor is conceived as the relationship between 
what is said and what is meant to be said; it is not paraphrasable, but it is essentially not a 
question of language itself, but one of language use, therefore it is not a proper subject of 
traditional linguistics. 
lñe cognitivist theory 
The most strikingly new idea of cognitive linguistics - represented by Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1993 - is the falsity of the whole distinction between literal and 
figurative meaning (Lakoff 1993:205). In a thorough and detailed manner, Lakoff illustrates 
very convincingly in his 1993 anicle that a great many common concepts of ours are 
metaphorical and that metaphor is a futed pan of our conceptual system (ibid.). 
The cognitivist view takes over and develops many ideas of the theories described 
above while rejecting others. From the interaction theory it agrees with the idea that 
metaphors can create new similarities, and that there is a stnictural correspondence between 
the two concepts a metaphorical relationship is applied to. On the other hand, it drops the 
idea that dead metaphors are not real metaphors: conventional metaphors are considered 
especially interesting for the study of metaphor, because they reveal certain fundamental 
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processes of thinking, and fit into a whole range of correspondences also present in novel 
metaphors. 
From the pragmatic theory cognitivists adopt the idea that metaphor can be interpreted 
as a nonlinguistic behaviour by saying that metaphor is not simply a matter of language but 
of thought and reason (Lakoff 1993:203). However, they reject the somewhat simplifying 
view that metaphor would just be a mere problem of language use. In the cognitive 
interpretation metaphor is a central part of synchronic linguistics because much of our 
semantic system is metaphorical (Lakoff 1993:239). 
In the cognitivist view metaphor means understanding one domain of experience (i.e. 
target domain) in terms of a very different domain of experience (Le. source domain). The 
pattern is: 
'A is B' 
where A is more abstract, less concrete, and B is less abstract, more concrete. Lakoff s 'A 
is B' is very much different from Searle's 'S is P', because 'S is P' is an actual statement 
expressing a metaphorical relationship between two actually appearing objects of the world, 
while 'A is B' is a metaphorical relationship between two concepts, which never appears like 
this in real-life statements but which has many different linguistic surface-manifestations 
which relate to each-other in a systematic way. For example, one never encounters the 
statement THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS - which is an 'A is B' relation - in actual real-life 
conversations, but one may very well hear utterances such as: 
What is the foundation of your theory? The theory needs more suppon. We need to 
construct a strong argument instead of that shaky one. We have put together the 
framework of the theory. 
These are surface manifestations of one and the same underlying conceptual metaphor (and 
note, none of them are of the structure 'S is P', but could be reformulated as such, if 
needed). 
Cognitivists also noticed that metaphors have an imer structure called mapping, which 
is a set of ontological correspondences between the two domains of experience. In these 
mappings the so-called Invariance Principle niles: the mappings preserve the cognitive 
topology of the source domain, consistent with the inherent suucture of the target domain 
(Lakoff 1993:215). 
The insight which gives the cognitivist view great credibility and reliabilty is that 
these conceptual metaphors are not isolated, but systematic: separate metaphors are naturally 
grouped in our conceptual system and, together with relations based on other principles (like 
metonymy). they form so-called idealized cognitive models (ICMs), which structure our 
thinking and understanding of the world. Also, these metaphors do not float in the air, but 
are motivated by being grounded in nonrnetaphorical experiences. 
To illustrate this, let us turn back to Searle's example of an 'S is P' relation: Sally 
is a block of ice. Searle correctly states that there is no literal sirnilarity between objects that 
are cold and people who are unemotional, but does not give a plausible explanation for why 
the speaker would use this utterance to characterize Sally. Lakoff comes up with a very 
convincing one: he notices that there is a conceptual metaphor of the form 'A is B' that gives 
rise to a whole range of metaphorical expressions: AFFECTION IS WARMTH (and the 
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opposite INDIFFERENCE IS COLD) (Lakoff 1993:239). 
We received a warm welcome. Our friendship has come to be just lukewarm. 
She is absolutely fngid. She sent him an icy glance. He was cool to me today. 
In sum, in the cognitivist approach metaphor is interpreted as understanding one 
(target) domain in terms of another (source) domain of experience in a way which is 
systematic and motivated, and which structures our conceptual system and helps us reflect 
our knowledge from more delineated concepts to less tangible ones in the understanding of 
the world outside. 
111. META-METAPHORS 
From a theoretical account let us now tum to a more practica1 question: what are the 
metaphors linguists belonging to the above mentioned schools use when talking about 
metaphor? 1s there a basic difference between the ways schools so different in nature use 
metaphors for metaphors? In seeking an answer to these questions 1 applied the cognitivist 
method of grasping the meta-metaphors in 'A is B' structures. In the fust unit of this part 
of my paper 1 am going to present meta-metaphors that appear in both the cognitivist and the 
non-cognitivist (interactional or pragmatic) approaches. The second unit will consist of meta- 
metaphors which only partially overlap in the two kinds of approaches, while the third unit 
will enumerate meta-metaphors which are totally different, sometimes even contradictory. 
The examples are taken from Lakoff and Johnson 1980 (hereafter LJ), Lakoff 1993 (hereafter 
L), Lakoff and Tumer 1989 (hereafter LT) and Black 1993 (hereafter B), Searle 1993 
(hereafter Se), Sadock 1993 (hereafter Sa), Shibles 197 1 (hereafter Sh), Kuhn 1993 (hereafter 
K), Van Noppen and Hols 1990 (hereafter VH) respectively. Groups of examples preceded 
by '1.' are cognitivist examples, those preceded by '11.' are non-cognitivist ones. The Arabic 
numerals following the abbreviations indicate page numbers. 
Overlapping meta-metaphors 
The most general meta-metaphor suucturing the way linguists on both sides think 
about metaphors is METAPHOR IS A MEANS. This meta-metaphor is a manifestation of 
the more comprehensive event structure, which goes like this: 
States are locations (bounded regions in space). 
Changes are movements (into or out of bounded regions). 
Actions are self-propelled movements. 
Purposes are destinations. 
Means are paths (to destinations). 
Difficulties are impediments to motion. ( . . . ) 
Long terrn, purposeful activities are journies. (Lakoff 1993:220) 
The metaphors we have to do with fit into this general stmcture like this: the two 
most basic human activities are conceptualized as 1) ACTIVITY IS WORK and 2) 
ACTIVITY IS MOTION. And since when using metaphors we are engaged in the activity 
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of understanding, along the above lines understanding can be conceptualized in the following 
way: (i) ACTIVITY IS WORK 1 UNDERSTANDING IS WORK 1 METAPHOR IS AN 
IMPLEMENT and (ii) ACTIVITY IS MOTION 1 UNDERSTANDING IS A JOURNEY 
IMETAPHOR IS A PATH, where both IMPLEMENT and PATH are subcases of the 
concept MEANS. ( (ii) is discussed later.) 
METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT therefore is a cornmon meta-metaphor in both 
camps of linguists: 
1. Metaphors are tools / devices (LJ193) for understanding, they can be used / 
handled / applied and they serve puvoses (LT xi). They are mechanisms(L202) (Le. 
more sophisticated instments). We understand abstract concepts by means of 
(U115) metaphor. Metaphors give us a handle (LJ124) on things. 
11. Metaphors can be used (B22). They are versatile and effective (B25). They can be 
relatively dispensable (B26), or can lend themselves to elaboration (B26). Metaphor 
is a cognitive instrument (B31) whichfunctions / operates / works (B22). Metaphors 
express (=  press out) thoughts. They satisfy semantic needs (Sa48). 
A subtype of METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT is METAPHOR IS A VISUAL 
INSTRUMENT, which is pan of the very generally applied UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
metaphor mapped in the following manner: 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
The person who tries corresponds to the person who 
to understand something makes use of his 
organ of sight 
Ideas to be understood correspond to objects to be 
seen 
METAPHORS ARE VISUAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
1. Metaphors give insight in vague concepts (LJ7). They highlighr some aspects of 
concepts while hiding (1.e. casting shadow on) others (LJ61). Metaphors do not only 
indicafe (iJ135) similarities, but also reflect (LJ46) correspondences. 
11. Metaphorspresent insight (B21), project implications (B28), they are ontologically 
illuminaring (B39), they focus on (B39) conceptual systems. Metaphors are often 
vague (Se96) and obscure (B20). Metaphor forces us to see (Sh16) reality in a certain 
way, it clanifies things (Sh20). 
Note the slight difference between the two groups of examples: in the cognitivist one 
metaphors are always clear and bright, while in the noncognitivist one they are sometimes 
vague and obscure, a difference which iconically shows the degree of transparency of the 
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problem of metaphor in the two approaches. 
Another meta-metaphor that can be found on both sides is THE CONCEPTUAL 
SYSTEM IS A BUILDING / METAPHOR IS ITS FRAMEWORK (with a structure of its 
own): 
1. Metaphors are afixedpart (L208) of our conceptual system. They arefundamental 
(L229) in our thinking, we base our actions on metaphors which underlie everyday 
expressions (L204). The system of metaphors is built into (LT64) the conceptual 
system, they structure our concepts (U46). Metaphors establish correspondences 
(LT96), they are grounded (LT64) in experience. The system of metaphors itself has 
a tight inner structure (L206), interna1 consistency (U43), with portions (LT111). 
Metaphors need empirical support (L246), with which they can serve as the basis 
(LJ55) for novel metaphors, that is, extensions. Metaphors sharply delineate (LJ55) 
abstract concepts. 
11. Metaphor has grounds and relations to its grounding (B19). Metaphors can be 
affimed (Le. made firm) (B30). Metaphors have a basis of their own (Sa42) with 
underlying principles (Sa42). 1s metaphor an edifTce that rests on the rock bottom of 
literal similes (Se97)? Metaphor is deeply embedded (Le. firmly fixed in a mass) in 
our mode of sensibility (Se99). Metaphors arefundamental to science and have a wide 
bearing (K538). Metaphor establishes links between language and the world (K539). 
Metaphors are deep in our communicative system (VH3). 
We can easily observe that this is the most widely used meta-metaphor in both the 
cognitivist and the noncognitivist works, which on its pan again proves how 'deeply 
embedded' metaphor is in our way of thinking. 
Partially overlapping meta-metaphors 
In this subchapter 1 arn discussing meta-metaphors which otherwise correspond to 
each-other in the case ot the two parties, but which have entailments or subtypes that are 
different and lead to imponant conclusions.The first very general meta-metaphor that appears 
is METAPHOR IS A HUMAN BEING. This has the following examples: 
1. We think that dead metaphors are very much alive (LT55). Metaphor is robust; it 
embodies generalizations (L205). 
11. Metaphors can be oíd (B35) / dead / alive and kicking (Sa44) / active (B25). 
A common subtype of this meta-metaphor is METAPHOR IS A SOCIAL 
SUPERIOR: 
1. Metaphors sanction / justlfy / dictate / allow actions, they have power over us 
(LT142). 
11. Metaphors have power (B21) / force (26) / an effect (Sa43) / immuniq to 
contradiction (Sa49). Metaphors can be successful / failed (B22) /prove rich (B26) 
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/strike. seize (B31) / be feeble or strong (Se87) lachieve justijication (Shl). Metaphor 
commits the speaker to certain understandings (Se99), supplies and juxtaposes things 
(K533), captivates us (Sh3), determines how and what we see (Sh9), and it forces us 
to see reality in a certain way (Sh16). 
It is quite striking that this SOCIAL SUPERIOR metaphor has a lot more exarnples 
in the works of noncognitivists than in those of cognitivist authors. This can be interpreted 
as showing that the problem of metaphor is 'more superior' or 'has more power on' those 
linguists who deal with metaphor in a more traditional and less effective way than on those 
who represent a contemporary theory of metaphor. 
Another subtype of the HUMAN BEING metaphor is METAPHOR IS A CREATOR 
/ PROGENITOR: 
1. Metaphor gives meaning to form, it isproductive (LM21) in the sense that it creates 
new understanding (LJ235). 
11. Metaphorical use can be pregnant (B25). Metaphor can generate knowledge (B38), 
can be a surrogate for verbal fonnulation (B38). Metaphors cal1 forth / create 
similarities (K533). 
But the HUMAN BEING meta-metaphor has a subtype which only turns up in the 
works of cognitivist authors: METAPHOR IS AN ASSISTANT. 
1. Metaphors do the job of understanding for us, they help us to perfonn certain 
actions (LJ95). They provide understanding (LJ154). 
It is not surprising to find this, because metaphor poses a problem for noncognitivist 
writers, and difficulties are not helpful, they are impedirnents to motion, that is, to action, 
that is, to understanding (as we have seen in the event structure presented by Lakoff in 
above). 
Previously 1 have discussed the very general meta-metaphor METAPHOR IS A 
MEANS, which had two subtypes: METAPHOR IS AN IMPLEMENT and METAPHOR 
IS A PATH. The laner is part of the following mapping: 
UNDERSTANDING IS A JOURNEY 
The person who tries corresponds to the traveller . 
to understand something 
The abstract concepts correspond to the destination. 
to be understood 
The concepts and experiences correspond to the starting point. 
we already possess 
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METAPHOR IS A PATH 
This meta-metaphor appears in the following forms: 
1. Our field of research (L219) is metaphor. 1s it true that one gers away from 
concrete physical experience, starts from the literal meaning and winds up / am'ves 
at a metaphorical interpretation (L205)? We understand abstract concepts by way of 
/ via metaphors. The theory of metaphor can be rraced back to Reddy (L204). The 
locus of metaphor is thought (L204). Metaphor goes beyond the realm of conventional 
language (LJ54). 
11. Metaphor is a way of thinking (VH3). Metaphor is open-ended (Se96). Metaphor 
communicates in an indirect way what might have been communicated directly (Sa43). 
'S is P' is a roundabout way of asserting that 'S is R' (Se89). Metaphor is sometimes 
regarded as a deviation from the normal route (Shll). 
It is worth noting that, although the meta-metaphor appears in both types of writings, 
the way it does is very much different: for cognitivists the metaphor-path is direct, easy to 
follow, for noncognitivists it is indirect, a roundabout way, or even a deviation. This, again, 
shows a basic difference in the attitudes of the linguists. 
In the common METAPHOR IS A MEANS 1 UNDERSTANDING IS A JOURNEY 
meta-metaphor two almost contradictory subtypes occur. In the case of cognitivists it is 
METAPHOR IS A MAP: 
1. A spatial type of metaphor is orientational metaphor (LJ14). 
Metaphors are expressed in fixed panerns (L210) 1 schemas (L214) 1 projections 
(L229) 1 templates (L233), which fit (LJ83) experience and preserve the cognitive 
topology (L215) of the target domain. Metaphors are guides (LJ156) for future 
actions. 
In the case of noncognitivists it is METAPHOR IS AN OBSTACLE: 
11. Metaphor is sometimes a stumbling block in the path of the linguist (Sa51). 
Metaphor is the locus of semantic change (Sa57). There is a boundary between 
literally and noniiterally conveyed communication (Sa53), a limit where meaning 
leaves off and figuration begins (Sa5 1). There are also inrractable cases of metaphor 
(Sa5 1). 
No comment is needed to explain how these two meta-metaphors show the way the 
two parties deal with metaphor. 
Non-overlapping metaphors 
There is a number of meta-metaphors which oniy appear in the works of either the 
cognitive or the noncognitive authors. In the former group only one but very powerful meta- 
metaphor can be found, and this is METAPHOR IS A SUBSTANCE / RESOURCE: 
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1. Metaphors pervade (LJ3) our way of thinking (like smells or fluids). Cultural 
values are deeply entrenched (LJ23) in metaphors (like in ground). Metaphors supse  
our thoughts (like colour or moisture), they can be applied (like ointments or glue) 
(LJ103) and they won't mix (LJ95). Metaphor is widespread and it is a rnaner of 
thought (L202). Like air, metaphor is omnipresent, accessible to everyone, 
irreplaceable and indispensable (LT xi). It is a rich source of elaboration (LJ61). 
For noncognitivists metaphor is understood in the following metaphorical ways: 
METAPHOR IS A DIFFERENT LANGUAGE / TERMINOLOGY 
Metaphors have to be translated / interpreted / explained (Se98). 
METAPHOR IS A HIDDEN OBJECT 
We have to spot metaphors. We are on the look-out for metaphors (Se103) 
?METAPHOR IS A GAME 1 PLAY 
Metaphor cannot begin until the referents of game have been established (K537). The 
S term plays un important role in metaphor (Se 104). 
?METAPHOR IS AN ACCIDENT 1 MISTAKE 
Some metaphors are fatal for the simile thesis (Se98). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The very fxst coniusion to be drawn is that scientific language is deeply metaphorical. 
The data enumerated in the above pages speak for themselves, and the fact that the reader 
does not easily notice them is not to be explained by saying that they are not metaphorical, 
but that they are so natural and conventional that a meta-linguistic consciousness is needed 
to throw light on them. 
Moreover, metaphors for metaphors can not oniy be found in the works of cognitive 
linguists, who celebrate the phenomenon of metaphor, but also in the scientific discourse of 
more or less traditional writers, who regard metaphor as either improper in scientific writing 
or not a subject to be treated in synchronic linguistics at all. Why cannot they free 
themselves of metaphor even when dealing with metaphor itself? Because metaphor helps 
them understand and express new ideas, it serves as a handle when walking on swampy soil. 
It is m e  that throughout the analysis 1 have been using the methodology of cognitive 
linguistics, but this in itself is not an explanation for the clarity of the results. If there is 
nothing to find, the most fantastic methods will also fail to reach anything. But the picture 
of meta-metaphors delineated in my paper meets al1 the requirements cognitive linguistics has 
of metaphors, the network of meta-metaphors is not haphazard but systematic, it brings 
understanding to an abstract concept (Le. metaphor) by relating it to more concrete concepts 
(i.e. implements, human beings, paths, maps etc.), of which we have a much clearer 
understanding and more basic, cultural or bodily, experience. The system of meta-metaphors 
is not accidental but has strong links with other metaphors commonly used in our thinking 
(e.g. the event structure). 
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Regarding the two-way distinction of meta-metaphors, namely that of cognitivist and 
noncognitivist approaches, the most eye-catching finding is that most of the meta-metaphors 
are similarly used by both parties, as presented in 11. 1s it not strange, one would ask, that 
when putting forth a totally new theory of metaphors, the metaphorical system cognitive 
linguists use is not radically different from the one used by traditional writers? 1 do not 
consider this a failure of my research, on the contrary, 1 would put this the other way round: 
the way noncognitivist authors use meta-metaphors is in total correspondence with what 
cognitivists say about how meta-metaphors work! Despite their basically different views, 
interactionalists and pragmatists display the same metaphorical system as cognitivists do, in 
other words, what noncognitivists say and do in their writing is contradictory. On the other 
hand, what cognitivists say and do is consistent. 
This is to say that cognitive linguistics throws light on certain metaphorical processes 
in scientific discourse, be it traditional or not, which were present in the scientific discourse 
of earlier authors, too, but in an unconscious way. 
A smaller group of meta-metaphors used by the two parties is of those which are 
different. 1 regard them as iconically showing the linguists' attitude towards their own topic: 
for cognitive theoreticians metaphor is an assistant, a map to orient their quest, an aid and 
a resource to help and feed them mentally, for noncognitivists it is an obstacle in their way, 
a language or terminology that has to be decoded, a hidden object that has to be found, that 
is, a problem not very easy to solve and understand. 
As a f m l  conclusion, 1 find the cognitivist position and its methods successful in 
dealing with metaphors for metaphors and with the phenomenon of metaphor in general. 
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